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With the continued development of modern vehicular communication systems, there is an
ever growing need for cutting edge security in these systems. A misbehavior detection systems (MDS) is a tool developed to determine if a vehicle is being attacked so that the vehicle
can take steps to mitigate harm from the attacker. Some attacks such as distributed denial
of service (DDoS) attacks are a concern for vehicular communication systems. During a
DDoS attack, multiple nodes are used to flood the target with an overwhelming amount
of communication packets. In this thesis, we investigated the current MDS literature and
how it is used to prevent DDoS attacks. Additionally, we proposed and developed a new
distributed multilayer perceptron classifier (MLPC) and evaluated it using vehicular communication simulations generated using OMNeT++, Veins, and Sumo. These simulations
contained a group of normal vehicles and some attacking vehicles. During the simulations,
two different attacks were conducted. Apache Spark was then used to create the distributed
MLPC. The median F1-score for this MLPC architecture was 95%. This architecture outperformed linear regression and support vector machines, which achieved 89% and 88%
respectively, but was unable to better random forests and gradient boosted trees which both
achieved a 97% F1-score. Using Amazon Web Services (AWS), it was determined that
model training and detection time were not significantly increased with the inclusion of

additional nodes after three nodes including the master.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Introduction

With modern technologies such as Telsa’s self driving vehicles entering the mass market,
the demand for stronger, more robust vehicular communication systems increases. As the
computational power and connectivity of these vehicles increases, malicious users will find
ways to use these resources to generate harm. According to the United States Bureau
of Transportation Statistics, there were 228,679,719 licensed drivers in the United States
in 2019 [5]. As car manufactures produce 5G enabled vehicles, a significant amount of
potential networked vehicles may be vulnerable to attackers. To prevent this, researchers
developed misbehavior detection systems (MDS) to detect and mitigate these attacks. The
MDS consists of an algorithm designed to determine if an incoming data packet could be
the result of an attack. These algorithms are difficult to create due to the large amount of
attacks a malicious user could produce including man-in-the-middle (MITM), grey hole,
black hole, distributed denial of service (DDoS), and Sybil attacks. Statistical and machine
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learning approaches show great promise in both traditional and vehicular communication
networks MDS, but there is much work to be done in the field.

1.2

Distributed Denial of Service Attacks

A DDoS attack involves the malicious party utilizing multiple vehicles to produce high
quantities of network traffic in an attempt to damage the networks integrity. The vehicles
used in a DDoS attack are not aware that they are being utilized by the malicious user.
For this reason, the computers used in DDoS attacks are often referred to as ”zombies”.
Blocking the vehicles’ communication systems could cause a vehicular accident and in a
worse case scenario, the loss of human life. This attack can be difficult to detect due to
its use of zombie vehicles. Fig. 1.1 shows how the attacks are conducted in vehicular
communication systems. This thesis focuses on the detection and evaluation of DDoS in
vehicular communication networks.

3

Figure 1.1: DDoS Attack Structure in Vehicular Communications [2] [3]
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1.3

Proposed Solution

There are two major contributions of this thesis, the first being the development of a DDoS
attack in Objective Modular Network Testbed in C++ (OMNeT++) and the second being the proposed MDS based on a distributed neural network (NN) design. OMNeT++ is
a cutting edge simulation tool for network communications. Unlike most network tools,
OMNeT++ allows for the implementation of vehicular mobility via Veins and SUMO. The
implemented simulations contain a number of vehicles, allowing the MDS to utilize location and emission data from each vehicle. In a real world scenario, this information is
valuable and easy to collect.
The proposed MDS was built using results found by [6] on distributed MDS on already
existing vehicular communication datasets. Their research showed promising results using
distributed random forest models, but this analysis was not conducted on modern vehicular
communication simulators such as Network Simulator 2 (NS2) or OMNeT++. Additionally, [1] and [7] both generated very impressive results when utilizing neural networks on
NS2 based vehicular communication simulations. Thus, this study investigated the hypothesis that a distributed neural network would prove to be an effective MDS method, but also
that distributed technologies would also prove valuable in modern network simulations.

1.4

Thesis Organization

There are four additional chapters in this thesis. Chapter 2 introduces current research literature related to misbehavior detection in vehicular communication systems. The focus and
interest of these systems is on the effectiveness of modern statistical learning methods that
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are currently being implemented. Chapter 3 contains the proposed MDS and a discussion
on the detection methods used in the MDS, including an introduction to neural networks
and distributed computing. Chapter 4 contains the evaluations using the developed simulation models and the discussions on the simulation results. Chapter 5 gives conclusions and
the future work.
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Chapter 2
Literature Survey

2.1

An Overview for Security in Vehicular Networks

Before one can understand the importance of misbehavior detection in vehicular networks,
it is important to understand general vehicular network security architecture. The authors
in [8] developed a review of 114 research articles related to vehicular ad hoc network
(VANET) security. As described in the aforementioned review, VANETs are targets to
various attacks such as Bogus Information, Denial of Service, impersonation, eavesdropping, message suspension, and hardware tampering. The misbehavior detection systems
described later in this thesis work to counter these attacks. As described in [8], other forms
of security mechanisms such as public key cryptography, RSA, and Elliptic Curve Cryptography play a critical role in reducing the amount of intrusions that makes it into the
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system.
The remainder of this survey focuses specifically at misbehavior detection systems
(MDS) for vehicular communication networks. In the process of proposing a new reporting
protocol, [9] managed to effectively detail the steps needed to build a MDS. These steps
are as follows:

1. Misbehavior detection
2. Misbehavior reporting
3. Misbehavior investigation

Misbehavior detection is referred to as act of determining if a vehicle is suspicious for
abnormal behaviors. Most of the research work referenced in the following section is involved with this first step of the MDS. After misbehavior is detected by this first step in
the system, the misbehavior will be reported to a misbehavior authority (MA). The MA
will then be able to complete an investigation into the accusation. In [9], the researchers
developed a new misbehavior reporting message based on ASN.1. The message contains
multiple containers of information on the misbehaving vehicle. Examples of these containers include the EvidenceContainer, which contains information or previous reports of
vehicle in question, and the DetectionReferenceContainer which includes information regarding the type of error reported.
Because VANETs are a subset of mobile ad hoc network (MANET), it can be valuable
to view the wider body of MANET literature. An example of such research is [10]. The authors proposed an clustering based intrusion detection systems (IDS). Detailed descriptions
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of both the strengths and weaknesses of IDS architectures were included by the authors.
The stand-alone IDS architecture is the first of 3 architectures described. Stand-alone IDS
architectures are completely self contained systems. Cooperative architectures allow for
communications between neighboring nodes in the system. Lastly, Hierarchical IDS architectures involve dividing the notes in clusters for use in detection. Specific designs within
each of the described architectures are detailed in [10]. There was no statistical analysis
completed by the authors to determine the effectiveness of their IDS architecture against
the other architectures designed.

2.2

Vehicular Network Datasets and Simulation Software

To assist researchers in developing reproducible research, the authors in [11] generated the
Vehicular Reference MisBehavior Dataset (VeReMi). The authors specifically pointed out
the clear issue that many researchers are not using reproducible datasets and software in
the study of Vehicular Networks. VeReMi contains message logs designed to be used when
building misbehavior detection systems. The source code that generates this dataset is
public and contains over 255 simulations. VeReMi also includes multiple different attack
types, attacker densities, and different attack traffic densities. This gives the user many
options when designing the dataset.
Heijden et al. claim that this is the first dataset of its kind. This is a great achievement,
though the dataset is not perfect. VeReMi is only designed for detection algorithms and
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a user is not able to analyze the effects of multiple attacks in a single simulation. After
outlining VeReMi, the authors continued to use this data to conduct an analysis of the Gini
index. The Gini index results seemed to carry less of an impact than the dataset itself.
A simulation tool called Simulation of Urban Mobility (SUMO) is frequently referenced in many vehicular research activities. SUMO is an open source traffic simulation
software. As referenced by [12], SUMO is frequently used in the study of vehicular communications. Behrish et al. also stated that generally, this tool will be combined with another comminucation simulator such as NS2 or NS3. [13] is an example of SUMO’s usage
when combined with NS2. The work of Gruebler et al. is further discussed in the following
sections. SUMO has the ability to import network models from other simulation software
such as VISUM, Vissim and MATsim. [12] highlighted a handful of recent SUMO projects
such as iTETRIS, VABENE, and CityMobil. Of the tools discussed, iTETRIS shows the
most practicality for researchers of vehicular networks. iTETRIS was developed with the
goal of simulating V2X communications at the whole city scale. This was done by connecting NS2 and SUMO with the iTETRIS control system. Berish et al. stated that a graphical
user interface used to design road networks has been created but, this tool is not available
to the public at the time of publication (2011).
OMNeT++ is another simulation tool that is frequently utilized in vehicular communications research. This tool allows for a combination of graphical user interface (GUI),
C++, and network description (NED) based options for simulation development. Mohd
et al. utilized this software to show a distributed denial of service (DDoS) on vehicular
networks [14]. The study was based around the communications of 4 simulated vehicles.
A DDoS attack must come from more than one attacker. In this study, groups of 3, 6, 9,
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and 12 attacking vehicles were used in an attempt to disrupt the transmission of packets
from the 4 normal cars. Packets of either 1 KB, 10 KB, or 100 KB at 0.1 ms intervals were
sent by the attacking vehicles. This implementation in OMNeT++ was successful as the 12
vehicle DDoS attack was able to cause a 13.98% loss of packets between the 4 cars when
sending 100 KB packets.
Similarly, Kaur et al. utilized OMNet++ & ReaSE to develop DDoS attacks on Web
Servers [15]. This DDoS attack was generated using random distributed zombie hosts.
There were 119 devices used in this simulation. Three different routers and a variety of
web based servers were all included in this total. As the duration of the DDoS attack
increased, the bandwidth required for the web server increased. The amount of packets
dropped also increased with the attack duration. When adjusting for buffer size, the study
showed that smaller buffers increase the impact of the DDoS attack. Additionally, various
researchers have used these simulation techniques to generate the datasets used to design
misbehavior detection software [16][17].
OMNeT++ has proven to be a popular tool in modern network security research. The
authors in [18] compared the software to a testbed environment using a D-Link wireless
access point and two wireless clients. The testbed was replicated completely in OMNeT++.
Both the testbed and the simulation were hit by RTS, CTS, and ACK DoS attacks. For the
attacks on the real networks, a Wireshark network analyzer was used. The results given by
this study favored the use of OMNeT++ as a network simulator. During all three attacks, the
OMNeT++ simulation was able to give results within 1% of the real network. Though this
paper was not studying vehicular communication networks, its results do help to validate a
substantial amount of research that relies on OMNeT++.
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2.3

Simulations for Misbehavior Detection in Vehicular
Communication Systems

MITM attacks are a clear threat in vehicular communication networks. To accomplish this
attack, the hostile party must intercept valuable information from a normal vehicle. Giving
the attacker the ability to listen in, delay, drop, or modify packets crucial to vehicular safety.
The researchers in [19] showed how these attacks can be created using OMNeT++, SUMO,
and VEINS. This simulation used the default map given in Veins. A total of 100 cars and
5 RSUs were used for this simulation along with either 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, or 50%
malicious nodes. With the study simulation being fairly well documented and being based
in OMNeT++, it should not be prohibitive to recreate it if needed for verification. Both
distributed and fleet based attacks were compared in the study. Between each of the three
aforementioned MITM attacks, The distributed nodes produced more harmful results to the
network than the fleet based design. This proved more apparent as the percent of attackers
increased to 20% or more.
A comparison between the affect of pure flooding, multipoint relay (MPR) flooding,
and geographic aware flooding (GAF) techniques on vehicular communication systems
was conducted by [20]. GAF works similarly to a pure flooding method if the sender is in
front of the recipient but it will drop packets if sent from behind. This is because of the
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assumption that if the vehicle is behind the recipient it is no longer a threat. MPR is based
on a protocol called optimized link state routing (OLSR). This technique works through the
idea of each vehicle relaying the message to only a small amount of nearby vehicles. The
message will have to then move through each section of vehicles. The authors proposed that
flooding can be used as an effective method of forced communications between vehicles
in a safety critical situation. To test this hypothesis, accident simulations were created in
NS2. Each method was studied using a flooding rate of 5, 10, and 20 packets per second
with each vehicle moving at 130 kph. The pure flooding method proved more effective
at delaying background packets while maintaining a high packet delivery ratio. It was
mentioned that pure flooding did cause a larger amounts of network traffic overhead than
the other flooding methods.

2.4

Statistical Approaches to Misbehavior Detection in Vehicular Communication Networks

Statistical approaches show great promise in the topic of MDS. [16] and [21] show how
various machine learning models can be used in the detection of Sybil, DoS, and false alert
attacks in vehicular communication networks. Gyawali et al. studied the use cases of kNearest Neighbors, Logistic Regression, Decision Tree Classifier, Bagging, and Random
Forest in both the publications. The methods tested in [16] and [21] utilized the VeReMi
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datasets and Veins for network simulations. This leads to more reproducible research.
These papers all the use of precision, recall, and F1-score as the performance metrics.
Precision is the ratio of correctly predicted attacks vs. the amount of total predicted attacks.
Recall refers to the predicted attacks vs. the number of actual attacking vehicles. The F1score is the weighted average of the precision and the recall of the model.
Precision and Recall are common metrics used to discuss the efficiency of a statistical
algorithm. F1-score is the weighted average of the precision and recall values. A key
difference between the papers is the addition of the Dempster-Sharfer theory (DS) in [16].
By adding DS to the existing methods proposed in [21], Gyawali et al. were able to produce
higher F1-Scores for the bagging and random forest models which were the top performers
in both papers. Table 2.1 contains the results for the proposed false alert verification scheme
at a 30% attacker density.
Model

F1-score (Non-DS)

F1-score (DS Applied)

K-Nearest Neighbor

.94

.841

Logistic Regression

.78

.687

Decision Tree Classifier

.94

.941

Bagging

.94

.986

Random Forest

.95

.986

Table 2.1: Effect of DS on F1-score

Other classification methods such as support vector machines (SVM) have also been
utilized in misbehavior detection. The collection, exchange, analysis, and propagation
(CEAP) algorithm written by [22] utilized SVM in the analysis step of their design. In
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this model, various watchdog vehicles monitor communications and use the SVM model to
analyze the data collected. The collection and exchange elements of this system are based
on the vehicular ad hoc network quality of service link state routing (VANET QoS-OLSR)
protocol. Various kernel designs such as linear, polynomial, and Gaussian Radial Basis
Function kernels were compared prior to the final design of the SVM algorithm. Though
the performance difference was not extreme, the Gaussian Radial Basis function outperformed the others. After using the SVM model for detection, the system will then send out
the necessary information to other watchdog vehicles. This MDS was compared to systems using only SVM, DS and averaging on a dataset generated using VanetMobiSim and
MATLAB. CEAP outperformed all models to which it was compared in terms of accuracy,
attack detection rate, false positive rate, and packet delivery ratio. The less complex SVM
model was not far behind CEAP, but this was not the case for the other two models. The
simulation did produce a large performance difference between CEAP, DS, and Averaging.
Neural Networks have also been considered in MDS design. The authors in [23] developed a convolutional neural network (CNN) architecture to detect traffic anomalies.The
proposed CNN included 8 hidden layers, half of the hidden layers being convolutional and
half being sub-sampling layers. The authors compared this model to a system designed
using principle component analysis (PCA). The authors of this paper did not use an open
source dataset, instead utilizing their own network testbed for their analysis. When comparing the CNN and PCA based models, the authors found that the CNN model produced
higher true positive values. The paper also indicated that the CNN model produced less
bias than the PCA equivalent.
The authors of [13] also found use in neural networks. This paper described an artificial
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neural network (ANN) architecture designed to detect Black Hole attacks in VANETs. A
Black Hole attack is a specific form of DoS attack in which important packet information
is discarded by the attacker. Fuzzification was applied to the dataset prior to the training of
the ANN. The fuzzification process helped to create a more distinct boarder between each
feature. SUMO and Mobility VEhicles (MOVE) were used to generate the NS2 simulations
ultimately used. In the end, the ANN based MDS had a classification rate of 99% for both
the normal and abnormal classes. Since the authors included the true positive, true negative,
false negative, and false positive rates, the following values can be found. The precision of
the model is .998, recall is .99 and the F1-score is .998.
Ali et al [1] have also produced research on the detection of grey hole attacks using
similar strategies. A grey hole attack differs from the previously mentioned black hole
attack in the frequency that it attempts to drop packets. The black hole attack will drop
all information where the grey hole will only discard some of the information. In [1],
both SVM and feed forward neural network (FFNN) are utilized in an effort to detect
these grey hole attacks. The attack simulation was conducted using NS2, SUMO, and
MOVE, all common tools in vehicular network research. Much like in [13], fuzzification
was used prior to the model training process. Both models proved effective at detecting
the grey hole attacks produced. In fact, both models produced an accuracy score of over
99.7%. Precision, recall, and f1-scores were calculated so this research can be more easily
compared to [13] and [21], etc. Please refer to Table 2.2 for more information.
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Model

FFNN

SVM

Precision

.998

.999

Recall

.999

.997

F1-score

.998

.997

Table 2.2: Derived Precision, Recall, and F1-score from [1]
Ghaleb et al.’s research conducted in [7] continues with the theme of artificial neural
networks . The authors of this study designed an ANN model based MDS to detect simulated hidden vehicles and illusion attacks. The proposed architecture was broken into 4
stages including Information Acquisition, Information Sharing, Data Analysis and Features
Driving, and Misbehavior Detection. In the end, the model contained 7 features and 1 hidden layer with 15 neurons. Next Generation Simulation (NGSIM) was used for the testing
and validation of this model. This set was generated using synchronized digital video cameras on real world highways [24]. An 80 / 20 ratio of normal vs. misbehaving vehicles was
used. The F-score results for this model remained above .97 for each of the 4 vehicles analyzed. These results are comparable to the results found by [13] and [16]. Unfortunately,
because the studies used different datasets, it is hard to make accurate comparisons.
Deep learning methods have also been utilized by MDS researchers. Researchers at
Ewha W. University engineered a deep neural network (DNN) architecture to detect suspicious activity in a vehicles controller area network (CAN) [25]. The DNN model focused
on detecting false information targeting the vehicles tire pressure light. Open Car Testbed
and Network Experiments (OCTANE) was used to generate the dataset used to train and
test the DNN model. The model was analyzed with 3 layers, 5 layers and 7 layers. All
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three models succeeded in predicting both the attacking packets and normal packets. At 7
layers the ability to detection did not increase but, normal packet detection did by 4%. As
expected training time and testing time increased as the layers increased.
The authors in [17] utilized hypothesis testing to detect rogue nodes in VANET systems.
The data was generated by a simulation utilizing OMNET++, SUMO, and VACaMobil.
For traffic flow modeling the greenshield model was used. False Information and Sybil
attacks were both considered and tested in this IDS simulation. If the test statistic is not
within a 99% confidence interval, the parameter will be rejected. The proposed methods
true positive and false positive values were compared to data-centric misbehavior detection (DCMD) and efficient and light-weight intrusion detection mechanism for vehicular
network (ELIDV). Even as the number of attackers increased up to 40%, the proposed
IDS managed to get as much if not more true positives than the other two models. Though
ELIDV was scored very well, the same is true for the false positives test, with ELIDV being
marginally better when the attack rate is over 30%.
Researchers at Dalian University of Technology attempted to locate anomalies based
on the driver’s emotional state algorithm (EAD) [26]. The derived algorithm called EAD
makes use of an emotional recognition coefficient Rde to determine if the driver is a cautious, normal, or an aggressive driver. A gaussian mixed model (GMM), that takes the Rde ,
acceleration, velocity, and distance as inputs to detect the outliers. To test this new model,
the authors used the NGSIM dataset. This is a publicly available dataset maintained by the
U.S. Department of Transportation. The proposed algorithm was compared to the hierarchical temporal memory (HTM) algorithm using precision, recall, and F1-scores. On both
simulations, the EAD algorithm outperformed HTM. HTM gave comparable, often better,
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precision scores but had very low recall scores. Due to this, the F1-scores remained lower
than EAD. These scores in general do not seem to compare well with the models produced
in [16] [25] . In order to determine this, the models would have to be applied to the same
dataset.
Linear chain conditional random field (Linear-CRF) algorithms have also been analyzed for their effectiveness in misbehavior detection systems by [27]. This anomaly detection model aims to determine missing and false alarm data in the in-vehicle CAN communication system. The CANoe simulation software was used on an Win7 machine to
generate the CAN bus network data analyzed in this report. Randomly injected anomaly
data was added to this data manually by the authors. The proposed method included two
models a normal model based on a Linear-CRF and an anomaly model based on Veterbi’s
algorithm. The detection rate when using either independent model achieved over 90%
and grew as the number of states grow. Misreporting rate declined in a similar fashion.
When combined the authors noticed better detection and misreporting rates overall. Ideally the authors would have compared this model to more common models to give a better
representation of the increase in detection.
An analysis was performed by [28] to determine how effective various machine learning method were in misbehavior detection. The network simulation was developed using
NCTUns-5.0. This simulation included 4528 samples with 1427 of the samples being malicious. The authors used multiple attacks such as packet detention, suppression, and identity fording in the testing sample. Variants of Decision trees, random forest, K-means, and
naive bayes were all used to detect these attacks via a data mining software called Weka.
Random forest and a variant of decision trees were shown to be the most successful at de-
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tecting attacks. The authors did not split the results to show how effective each statistical
method was for each attack. Instead the reader is only given the results against all attacks.
Big data technique has also been found valuable in modern misbehavior detection systems. In 2019, [6] published research on the value of distributed schemes in combination with machine learning to detect DDoS attacks in vehicular communication systems.
The presented system converted a communications dataset into resilient distributed datasets
(RDD) using Spark. Once the data is in the RDD, each of the databases will be used to train
a decision tree. After the individual trees are trained, they are merged using the boostrap
sampling method commonly used in random forests. The proposed method was trained
on both the NSL-KDD [29] and UNSW-NB15 [30] datasets. NSL-KDD is derived from
KDDCUP99 but still remains rather out of date. Thus UNSW-BN15, a dataset developed
from the Australian Centre for Cyber Security, was also used. The resulting Random Forest algorithm was compared to SVM, gradient boosting decision trees (GBDT), XGBoost
and Naive Bayes. Though both XGBoost and gradient boosting decision trees (GBDT)
performed well, the authors version of boosted random forest out performed all other algorithms. Table 2.3 shows the F1-score of the top performing models on the NSL-KDD
dataset [6].
Model

RF

GBDT

XGBoost

F1-Score

.965

.959

.960

Table 2.3: Top Performing F1-scores on NSL-KDD dataset
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2.5

More Misbehavior Detection Systems

Non-machine learning approaches also have their place in misbehavior detection. One such
example of this is Müter and Asaj’s entropy-based system [31]. Much like in [25], this
study focused on determining outliers in the vehicles CAN messages. Instead of including
accuracy statistics of the proposed model, the paper detailed how the entropy can be used
to detect common attacks. Attacks such as increased frequency, message flooding, and
plausibility attacks were all studied. Unfortunately, the dataset used for this study was
collected by connection straight to a production vehicles CAN network. Ideally, the authors
would have included statistics toward the accuracy of this method on a publicly available
dataset.
Haydari et al. presented a method of anomaly detection that was developed to detect
DDoS attacks on road side unit (RSU) [32]. The method proposed is based on the online
discrepancy test (ODIT), which itself is based on the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) and Geometric Entropy Minimization (GEM). A practical version of CUSUM called Generalized
Cumulative Sum (G-CUSUM) was compared to the developed model in testing. OMNET++, SUMO, and Veins were all used to generate the simulation data for the analysis
of the detection algorithms. Simulation parameters are included in the paper. The authors
simulated the traffic based on a street in the University of South Florida’s campus while
complying with IEEE 802.11p. When applying low rate DDoS attacks to this dataset, it
was found that proposed method had a lower detection delay vs. false alarm probability
than Generalized Cumulative Sum (G-CUSUM) based algorithms.
A modified version of the Reference Broadcast Method (RBS) was introduced by [33]
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to prevent DoS attacks in vehicular communications. RBS is based on the idea of having
an additional reference node that is used as an intermediary between the nodes in question. The presented algorithm called IP-CHOCK combines the RBS model with clock
synchronization. The actual implementation of IP-CHOCK was conducted in C++. Detailed pseudocode was referenced in this article. The Network Simulator (NS-2.34) was
used along with tool command language (tcl) to run the simulations. Simulations were
completed using either 20 or 50 nodes with 2 of the nodes being attackers. When compared to an IP-trackback approach, the RBS based model produced better packet delivery
ratio and throughput. The proposed model did have an increased delay time initially, but
this delay decreased over time.
Greedy Geographic Routing is a GPS based method presented in [34]. This algorithm
uses the GPS information to update a trust routing table (TRT). The TRT will hold a trust
value and a progress value for each neighbor which can be used for misbehavior detection.
This table needs to be updated and monitored regularly to indicate when ACK messages
are received from the destination node. If a node packet is not from the destination or the
source, it will be dropped. The authors tested this method using data that was generated
using OMNeT++, SUMO, and VaCAMobil. Ideally, more descriptive statistics such as accuracy and false positives would have been presented in this paper. Without these statistics,
the efficiency of the method cannot be easily compared to the other algorithms referenced.
Unlike in wired systems, vehicular communication systems are also vulnerable to jamming attacks. This form of DoS involves the use of a malicious signal used to disrupt
normal communication at the radio frequency level. In other words, attackers would use
artificial noise to muddy a healthy vehicular communication system. The authors in [35]
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presented a novel way to detect these attacks using an system based on k-means. This
method was analyzed against Interference, Smart Attack, and Constant Attack Scenarios.
Though the authors’ data visualizations support their claim that their unsupervised learning
method was successful, they used an entirely custom simulation. The study would be much
more trustworthy if they used a modern simulation tool or published their simulation code
for other researchers to review.
The authors in [36] focused on the use of a received signal strength indicator (RSSI) for
misbehavior detection. Their algorithm, referred to as INTERLOC, is specifically used to
detect Sybil attacks during times when GPS is not available. Since the RSSI values can be
collected from neighboring vehicles, INTERLOC does not require any RSUs to function.
INTERLOC works by creating a circle around each participating vehicle. By matching up
these circles, a localization polygon will encompass the vehicle in question. If the vehicle
is not within this range it is at risk of being a Sybil attacker. A combination of OMNeT++,
Veins, and SUMO were used to simulate this technique. The simulations ranged between
900 and 7200 vehicles. One vehicle was chosen at random to be the attacker. The chosen
vehicle would periodically be changed over time. The results of the simulations showed
that the INTERLOC algorithm was able to outperform both FRIIS and the misbehavior
detection algorithm developed by [37]. Unfortunately, the authors did not provide in-depth
details for the simulation software. This lack of information makes replication and validation of the study more difficult to accomplish.
Sentinel is a misbehavior detection algorithm that was proposed by [38]. This approach was specifically developed for software defined vehicular networks (SDVN) to protect against flooding attacks. The two primary steps of this method are detection and miti-
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gation. The detection step looks at both the new packet and flow to determine if a flooding
attack has occurred. The cut offs for misbehavior detection were determined manually by
reviewing their affects on detection rate and false positive rate. This could troublesome in
the fast moving world of vehicular communication networks. If the algorithm decides that
an attack was found, a tree building algorithm will search through all of the primary node’s
neighbors to determine the mischievous node. If a malicious node is found, the algorithm
will instruct the victim to drop any packets addressed from the attacker. To test the algorithm, the authors used simulations in OMNeT++, Veins, & SUMO. The algorithm was
found to perform fairly well at attack mitigation in environments with under 200 vehicles
but declined as the volume of vehicles increased.
Another approach for DDoS detection in vehicular communications systems was proposed by [39]. This method called multivariant stream analysis (MVSA) involves collecting statistics from the current traffic to generate rules. Each new packet will be compared
against the rules developed by the algorithm. Average payload, hop count, time to live
(TTL) value, and packet frequency are all used as the primary indicators in determining
multivariate stream weight. Once the multivariant stream weight is calculated from the
algorithm, the packet will be classified as a normal packet or an attacker. This method
was tested using simulations built in Network Simulator 2.34. The DDoS attacks were
conducted over the AODV routing protocol for each simulation. MVSA performed well
against the baseline algorithms used in regarding to throughput, accuracy, detection time,
and delivery ratio. The baseline algorithms used for this comparison are Hybrid Intrusion
Detection System (H-IDS), Multi filter, and trilateral trust. Ideally, a statistical standard
such as logistic regression could have been included in the baseline so that the method
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could be compared more easily to other approaches.

2.6

Research Challenges

Density-based fuzzy imperialist competitive clustering algorithm (D-FICCA) is a clustering algorithm developed by [40] to detect DDoS attacks in WSM. D-FICCA utilizes a
modified version of density-based spatial clustering of applications with noise (DBSCAN)
and the imperialist competitive algorithm (ICA). ICA is described using a metaphor where
the clusters are referred to as empires and the data points are referred to as colonies. Each
of the empires will attempt to take control of a given colony. Fuzzy logic controller was
built into the ICA algorithm to avoid the algorithm from assigning colonies based on poorly
performing features. The data used to compare D-FICCA was collected at Intel Berkeley
Research Lab via 54 different sensors. The authors did not give DDoS attack algorithm
used, but stated it was create using Matlab data generation algorithms. It was determined
that D-FICCA had the highest silhouette coefficient when compared to methods such as Kmeans, DBSCAN, and modify imperialist competitive algorithm and K-means (K-MICA).
Since this algorithm was built for stationary wireless sensor networks, it still needs to be
improved in vehicular communication networks due to the frequent mobility.

Distributed system applications are currently being investigated further in the field of
web based misbehavior detection systems. [41] shows an example of how Hadoop and
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HBase can be utilized along with neural networks for misbehavior detection. HBase is a
non-relational database developed for use in a Hadoop process. Once the data is collected
using Hadoop, it can be feed into the neural network to determine if a DDoS attack is occurring. Unfortunately, this method was not developed to determine individual attackers.
The researchers also did not run its efficiency over a large sample. Only one example is
given for a normal case, an attack, a busy traffic day, and a single factor detection approach.
As vehicular traffic in major cities continues to grow, so could the demand for distributed
architectures in vehicular communication systems. Studies comparing this method to the
random forest based method in [6] on vehicular communications systems could prove valuable.
Additional research in distributed system based misbehavior detection systems has been
conducted by Mizukoshi and colleagues. In [42] Apache Spark was combined with the use
of genetic algorithms for misbehavior detection. Since attackers will often use fake IPs, an
entropy based detection function was utilized. The authors compared results from both the
DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation and KAREN’s WITZ publicly available datasets.
These datasets contained communication data during DDoS attacks. This study utilized 16
nodes on the Hokkaido University Academic Cloud. Increasing these nodes made a clear
difference in the time required to complete the genetic algorithm. Detection rates on both
DARPA’s and KAREN’s dataset remained over 95% with false positive and false negative
rates under .02%. Unfortunately, the authors did not provide more reliable statistics such
as F1-scores. Ideally, this method would have been directly compared to other statistical
algorithms such as random forests, logistic regression, or naive bayes.
Traditional signal processing methods have also been applied to detection of DDoS
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attacks on web servers in combination with machine learning techniques. The authors in
[43] applied discrete Fourier transform (DFT) and discrete wavelet transform (DWT) to real
attack data collected from SURFnet. After the transformations were applied to the training
and testing datasets, the data was feed into naive bayes. By combining both the DFT and
DWT, Fouladi et al. was able to achieve attack detection accuracy of 95%. When only one
transformation was applied, DWT outperformed DFT in regards to its ROC curve but not
in terms of misbehavior detection accuracy. Unfortunately, statistics such as F1-score, was
not given by the authors. Applying DFT prior to running statistical algorithms could reduce
the need for more computationally advanced methods such as neural networks in vehicular
communication systems. Though, these methods would need to be thoroughly analyzed
against methods using statistics such as false positives, false negatives, and F1-scores.
Though the following paper does not focus on misbehavior detection or security, [44]
does show an interesting example of how graph theory and deep reinforcement theory can
be used in telecommunication systems. The authors suggested system is utilized to maximize the total throughput of the vehicle to vehicle (V2V) system. There are two stages to
this proposed system. The first is based on a bipartite graph of cellular users. Max N-cut
is then used for channel allocation of the users. The second half of the system is a deep reinforcement learning (DRL) system that is used for power control. The proposed resource
allocation method shows promising results in comparison to the random and hybrid models. Simulation parameters are included in this paper for replication purposes. As indicated
by the authors the training time is a concern for this method, but it was not an issue during
execution.
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Chapter 3
Misbehavior Detection of DoS Attacks in
Vehicular Networks

3.1

MDS Architecture

Previous researchers have been successful in developing detection methods for DoS attacks
using machine learning methods, but the issue of computation cost is not frequently discussed. To improve this, the misbehavior detection system could incorporate distributed
system technology to reduce the cost of detecting on each individual vehicle. One such
technology that solves this issue is Apache Spark. Apache Spark is an open-source distributed system technology that is designed for use with common computational languages
such as Python, R, and Scala. The primary function of this tool is to force parallel operations on a cluster. In the case of a vehicular communication system, this cluster is made up
of a group of nearby vehicles. At this point, the communication data is fed into a neural
network to determine if a DoS attack is occurring.
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3.2

Distributed Systems and Computation

A distributed system is a group of machines that are working together to appear as a single system by an end user. For use in vehicular communication systems, this is achieved
by considering each vehicle as a machine in the system. Each of these vehicles coordinates with each other to develop and use the neural network model. This system should
reduce the total resource allocation for each vehicle and increase the speed of misbehavior
detection.
Fig. 3.1 shows an example of how this architecture works at a high level. One vehicle
monitors the safety of the specified location. This vehicle then makes contact with the
neighboring vehicles to collaborate in misbehavior detection. The worker vehicles are only
to be used as additional computational resources. Each role should be rotated between
neighboring vehicles for added security.
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Figure 3.1: Vehicular Distributed System Example

To achieve a distributed architecture, Apache Spark is used in the proposed system.
Spark functions by splitting the data into a type of dataset referred to as a resilient distributed dataset. The RDD structure allows adjustments to the data to be performed in
parallel. The parallel computation gives the monitoring car the ability to use the workers
to speed up the misbehavior detection process. The monitoring car runs the driver program
used to utilize the resources on the other vehicles. Inside of the driver program, an object
called ”SparkContext” connects to the cluster managers. A resource manager is a tool that
determines the resource allocation for each node in the cluster. In this solution, Spark’s
own cluster managers were used. A visual representation of the cluster operation is shown
in Fig. 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Cluster Operation Diagram [4]

3.3

Introduction to Neural Networks

A neural network is an algorithm that is heavily influenced by the operation of neurons
in the brain. The goal for the initial model development was to create a classifier that
could work as effectively as the human brain. The single layer perceptron was developed
to simulate a neurons operation in the brain. By chaining these perceptrons, researchers
discovered that could create a network that closely resembles operations of a human brain.
Section 3.3.1 details the design of a single layer perceptron and Section 3.3.2 shows how
these perceptrons can be used to develop a neural network.

3.3.1

Single Layer Perceptron Classifier

A single layer perceptron is a binary classification algorithm designed to mimic a single
human neuron. The algorithm begins by multiplying each input by the weight associated
with the input value. A visual representation of this process can is shown in Fig. 3.3. For
this example, X is written as a given input and W is used to signify the weight value.
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Figure 3.3: Single Layer Perceptron

All of the multiplicative values determined in the last step must then be added together,
resulting in the following equation:

n

z = ∑ Wi ∗ Xi

(3.1)

i=1

Once the output z is determined, a comparison against the threshold value θ can be
conducted. This can be shown mathematically as:

f (x) =





1, if z > θ



0, otherwise

At this step the algorithm has now made its predictions on the dataset given.

(3.2)
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3.3.2

Multilayer Perceptron Classifier

By grouping together multiple single layer perceptrons, researchers determined that they
could create a model with a higher predictive output. This new model is often refered
to as a multilayer perceptron classifier (MLPC) or a feed forward neural network. This
architecture contains a series of layers. Each of these layers are essentially a column of
single layer perceptrons. The first of these layers is an input layer that must be the same
size as the number of features used in the given dataset. The layer often called the output
layer contains just enough perceptrons to achieve the required classification. The middle
layers, often referred to as ”hidden layers” are much more nebulous in nature. Unlike
the input and output layers, there is no strict formula for design. These layers are often
determined by trail and error or by a brute force algorithm. Fig. 3.4 contains a simple
visual example of the MLPC architecture.
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Figure 3.4: Multilayer Perceptron

Mathematically speaking, the MLPC is just a more complex version of the single layer
perceptron. Recall equation 3.1 and 3.2 from section 3.3.1, this formula is to be applied at
each layer of the MLPC with Xi being the previous output. For example to calculate H j ,
the following equation can be used:

n

H j = f ( ∑ W ji ∗ Xi )

(3.3)

i=1

To find Ok , the weight values need to be updated and H j is used instead of Xi . With
these adjustment, the following equation is derived:

n

O j = f ( ∑ Wk j ∗ H j )
j=1

(3.4)
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3.4

L-BFGS Optimization Routine

The Limited-memory Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno algorithm (L-BFGS) was selected as the optimization routine for the proposed model. This algorithm is a derivation
of Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno that is optimized for larger datasets. Two different
algorithms are used to explain the operation of this method. Algorithm 1 is a recursive
algorithm that is used to determine Hk ∇ fk , where Hk represents the inverse Hessian approximation value and ∇ fk is the gradient [45]. It is important to know that the use of an
approximate Hessian instead of a true Hessian is the reason that L-BFGS is a Quasi-Newton
method, not a true Newton Method. The determined Hk ∇ fk value is used to determine the
search direction pk in Algorithm 2.
Before diving into the nuance of L-BFGS, please understand that sk refers to the displacement and yk refers to the change in gradients. In Algorithm 1 there are two for loops
that are used to update the final Hessian matrix. The first loop calculates the current gradient q and the step length αi . One of the variables used to determine αi is ρk , which came
from the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell formula. ρk is calculated using the following formula:

ρk =

1
yTk sk

(3.5)

Prior to starting the second loop, the new q is multiplied by a initial inverse Hessian
matrix. Normally the initial inverse Hessian is found using the following formula, where I
is an initial Hessian approximation:

Hk0 = (

sTk yk−1
)I
yTk yk−1

(3.6)
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The matrix found by multiplying q and Hk0 is referred to as r. r is then repeatedly
updated using the derived β value on line 8 and the αi value derived on line 3. Once the r
value is equivalent to Hk ∇ fk , there is no need to continue and the algorithm stops.
Algorithm 1: L-BFGS Two-Loop Recursion to Compute Hk ∇ fk
1

q = ∇ fk

2

for i = k - 1, k - 2,..., k - m do

3

αi = ρi sTi q

4

q = q − αi yi

5

end

6

r = Hk0 q

7

for i = k - m, k - m + 1,..., k - 1 do

8

β = ρi yTi r

9

r = r + si (αi − β )

10

end

11

stop when Hk ∇ fk = r
The full computation of L-BFGS is shown in Algorithm 2. To start the algorithm must

have a starting estimated optimal value x0 , memory m greater than zero, and an initial
inverse Hessian Hk0 . The same method for determining the initial inverse Hessian matrix for
Algorithm 1 is applied here. At this point, the algorithm can calculate the search direction
pk and update xk+1 . Notice that to update xk+1 , the step length αi must satisfy Wolfe
conditions. The Wolfe condition is used to verify that ak gives a reasonable decrease to the
objective function f . The Wolfe condition can written as:
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f (xk + α pk ) ≤ f (xk ) + c1 α∇ fkT pk

(3.7)

z Please note that c is used as a constant between zero and one. At this point the algorithm
will remove the vector pair {sk−m , yk−m } if k is large than the memory m. Recall that sk
refers to the displacement and yk refers to the change in gradients. Otherwise, the new
values for sk are calculated. This process repeats until the algorithm converges.
Algorithm 2: L-BFGS
1

Choose starting point x0

2

Set integer m > 0

3

Choose Hk0

4

repeat

5

pk = −Hk ∇ fk from Algorithm 1

6

xk+1 = xk + αk pk where αk is used to satisfy Wolfe Conditions

7

if k > m then

8

9

Discard vector pair {sk−m , yk−m }
end

10

Compute vector pair sk = xk+1 − xk , yk = ∇ fk+1 − ∇ fk

11

k = k+1

12

until algorithm converges
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Chapter 4
Performance Evaluations and Results
Discussions

4.1

OMNeT++ Overview

In chapter 2, NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, NS2, and OMNeT++ were all introduced as viable
options for vehicular communication systems performance evaluations. Though all of these
datasets and tools can be used to evaluated MDS, OMNeT++ was used as the backbone
of the simulations discussed in this chapter. OMNeT++ is designed to handle advanced
communication simulations. To enable these simulations to include mobile vehicles, Veins
and SUMO must be used. SUMO is a traffic simulation software that generates the normal
vehicles and all for vehicular mobility. Veins is then used as glue to allow OMNeT++
and SUMO to communicate in order to generate vehicular communication systems. The
OMNeT++ simulations developed in this thesis utilize 1-hop broadcasting between the
vehicles and the roadside units. Therefor, each message will be distributed to all nodes in
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the range of the sender.

4.2

Simulation Settings and Background Information

All vehicular network simulations were developed on an Ubuntu Virtual Machine. Upon
installation, Veins is equipped with a built in map and mobile vehicular communication
system simulation. This is a general simulation in which 194 vehicles are all driving in
the same direction when an accident suddenly occurs 73 seconds into the simulation. This
accident lasts 50 seconds in total. This causes the vehicles to react and alert the other
vehicles of the upcoming traffic jam. The total simulation lasts 200 seconds and contains a
single road side unit. This simulation was used as a starting point for the DDoS simulation.
A series of modifications were made to the default simulation to fit the requirements of
this study. The simulation time was increased to 380 seconds. A simulation was included
for each of the following five vehicle amounts: 15, 20, 25, 30, and 35. In addition to the
vehicles previously described, four parked vehicles were included to preform the DDoS
attacks on the remaining vehicles and road side unit. Though these vehicles were utilized
in the attack, they would otherwise be considered the same as the mobile vehicles. These
vehicles were used as zombies by the attacker, which means that they communicated normally outside of the attack. There was no change to the accident that was included in the
default program at 73 seconds. Fig. 4.1 is a screen capture of a simulation taking place in
OMNeT++. In this image, the attackers are labeled as ”hacker” and the normal vehicles
are labeled as ”node”.
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Figure 4.1: Attack Simulation View in OMNeT++

Seven different versions of each attack simulation were developed to determine how
the MDS would handle different attack densities. The first simulation started at an attack
density of 10%. This means that an attack occurred for 10% of the total simulation time.
Attack density was then increase by 10% for each of the following simulations. Table 4.1
shows the time that each attack occurs during each simulation. For example, those that
occurred at the 10% attack density, ran from 50 seconds to 74 seconds and 210 seconds
to 224 seconds. The first attack started at 50 seconds for each attack density. The second
attack started at 210 seconds for each density, except for 70%, where it started at 174
seconds. During this time period, 25,000 WAVE short messages (WSM) were sent to
every vehicle. The code used to generate the WSM is based on the communication code
found in traCIDemo11p.cc of the Veins demo previously described. The malicious changes
were made in the handlePositionUpdate() method. Algorithm 3 describes how the attack
operates. This algorithm repeatedly creates WSM that contain the vehicles’ current road id
that are then distributed to all nearby vehicles. All code used for these simulations can be
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found in Appendix A.

Attack % 1st Attack Duration (s) 2nd Attack Duration (s)
10

50 - 74

210 - 224

20

50 - 74

210 - 262

30

50 - 112

210 - 262

40

50 - 150

210 - 262

50

50 - 150

210 - 300

60

50 - 150

210 - 337

70

50 - 150

174 - 340

Table 4.1: Attack Times used in Simulations
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Algorithm 3: 10% Attack Density Simulation
Result: Perform DDoS Attack
1

if (simulation time between 50 & 74) && (simulation time between 210 & 224)
then

2

for i:Range 1 to 25,000 do

3

sentMessage = true

4

wsm = new TraCI Demo Message

5

populate wsm

6

set wsm data to road id

7

send(wsm)
end

8

9

else

10

4.2.1

time last drove = simulation time;

Data Preparation

By default, the Veins simulation in OMNeT++ collected each vehicles x coordinate, y
coordinate, speed, acceleration, and CO2 emissions. A new data point for each of the
previously mentioned factors was collected during each second of the simulation. This
data was than exported to an excel file so it could be cleaned and analyzed in a Jupyter
Notebook. Before the data could be used to train models, all periods and number signs
were removed from the column names. The time column generated by OMNeT++ was
changed from ”t” to ”Time in Seconds” for readability. Than an ”if then” command was
used in excel to create a column labeling the attack times. If an attack occured during this
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time, the excel formula would output a 1. Otherwise, the result would be a 0. This column
was named ”Attack Bool” for all simulations. Each simulation was 380 rows. The column
size differed based on the number of vehicles used. The total columns for each simulation
can be found by multiplying the number of cars by five and then adding two columns for
the time and attack label.
The cleaned csv was then loaded into a Jupyter Notebook using Spark’s read method.
Before the data could be used in PySpark.ML models, all of the columns were converted
to floats. Additionally, the ”Attack Bool” column was changed ”Label” to match PySpark
coding norms. The last step prior to breaking the data into testing and training datasets was
to create a features vector. All of the models built in PySpark.ML used a vector representation of the data instead of multiple columns like other common libraries. This conversion
was done using the vectorAssembler class and the transform function in PySpark.ML.

4.3

MLPC Architecture Development

The MLPC architecture was developed to handle all previously mentioned attack percentages. All available features were used in model development. For example, the simulation
that contained 15 vehicles gave 76 features that were fed into the machine learning model.
The first layer of the MLPC must be the same size as the features being fed. Since the model
is attempting to determine if a DDoS attack is occurring, the result is boolean. Hence, two
is used as the value of the final layer. Through trial and error, it was determined that five
layers seemed to outperform smaller architectures. This testing also determined that ranges
just above the feature number worked well in the second layer. Further testing also indi-
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cated that smaller values performed best for the third and fourth layers. To narrow in on
possible high-performing architectures, Algorithm 4 was ran on all simulations.

Algorithm 4: Determine candidate layers via brute force methods
Result: Print F1-score of all tested layer combinations
1

2

for i in Range 80 to 100 do
for j in Range 5 to 10 do
for k in Range 2 to 10 do

3

4

layers = [76,i,j,k,2]

5

Design model using layers

6

Fit model using train data

7

Get predictions for test data

8

Determine F1-score using correct testing labels

9

if F1-score > .95 then
print layers & F1-score

10

end

11

12

13

end
end
The high performing results were then collected and moved into an excel report. If a

layer combination appeared multiple times, it was then ran on all simulations. This was
done to produce a model that would be universally valuable instead of being only effective
for a single attack density. The mean and median F1-scores were used to determine the
best fit model. The MLPC architecture that had the highest mean and median F1-scores
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was [N, 87, 9, 4, 2], where N is the number of features given. In this architecture, 76 is
referring to the input layer and two is the output layer. All columns of the dataset were used
as features with the exception of the labels. The middle values of 87, 9, and four are the
hidden layers of the neural network. The F1-score average for this layer design was 91.5%
and the median was 95.9%.
As mentioned in section 3.4, L-BFGS was used for the optimization routine. L-BFGS
was chosen over minibatch gradient descent due to the latter’s frequent underperformance
on the training data. PySpark.ML’s MLPC is trained using backpropagation, which is a
fairly standard training algorithm for neural networks. PySpark.ML uses logistic loss function for optimization.

4.4
4.4.1

Simulation Results
Model Comparison During Various Attack Densities

To test how this architecture compares to other common machine learning models, the design was implemented in a Jupyter Notebook on an Asus Zenbook. This machine contained
a Intel core i7-8565U CPU and 16 GB of RAM. The MLPC model was compared against
logistic regression (LR), random forest (RF), gradient boosted trees (GBT), and support
vector machines (SVM). A 70/30 train test split was used for all models. Additionally,
100 training iterations were used for all models with the exception of RF. PySpark.ML’s
RF does not give the option to adjust the iteration value. RF was set to a max tree depth
of 3. All of the models used were built into the PySpark.ML module. PySaprk.ML is a
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machine library produced by Apache Spark. This library was developed specifically for
use on Spark clusters. Accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score are used to compare these
models. The following formulas show how these statistics are calculated.
To find the accuracy of a model, the sum of the true positive (TP) and true negative (TN)
values must be divided by all possible outcomes. In the following formulas, FP stands for
false positive and FN stands for false negative.

Accuracy =

TP+TN
T P + T N + FP + FN

(4.1)

For precision, the TP is divided by the summation of the TP and the FP.

Precision =

TP
T P + FP

(4.2)

To determine the recall of a model, the TP must be divided by the summation of the
models TP and FN.
Recall =

TP
T P + FN

(4.3)

The F1-score is a weighted average of the precision and recall. This is calculated by
multiplying the precision by the recall, then dividing by the summation of the same values.
The previously derived value is then multiplied by 2 to calculate the F1-score.

F1 − score = 2 ∗

Precision ∗ Recall
Precision + Recall

(4.4)

The implementation of these functions in PySpark.ML was used for consistency. Appendix B contains the code used to generate the accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score
for each model. Additionally, these statistics were collected for each of the five simulation
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designs in respect to the number of vehicles. The average of each metric was used. Fig. 4.2
shows the accuracy of each model at different attack densities. Without further graphs, we
can see the weak point of the MLPC model. By selecting the median F1-score across all
attack densities, the overall architecture was not as effective at each density. It can be seen
that RF and GBT both produced higher accuracy scores on all attack densities. The MLPC
outperformed the LR and SVM models with the exception of the 40% attack density.
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Figure 4.2: Model Accuracy

The precision of each model followed a similar trend to the accuracy. GBT and RF outperformed the other models in all attack densities with the exception of 60% and 70% attack
densities for GBT. The MLPC performed comparably to the trained regression model. This
was partially due to the MLPC producing low scores at 40% regardless of the number of vehicles used in the simulation. SVM generally did not perform at the same level as the other
algorithms. Fig. 4.3 shows the precision value for each model at various attack densities.
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Figure 4.3: Model Precision

Recall was consistent across all models except the MLPC. RF, GBT, and MLPC all
performed well until the MLPC dropped at the 40% attack density simulation. Interestingly,
all of the models had much higher recall at 60% attack density than the 50% attack density.
The only exception to this was GBT, which dropped slightly before increasing at 70%. LR
performed fairly well, often better than the MLPC. SVM followed a similar trend to LR,
but producing weaker results. Fig. 4.4 shows the recall value for each model at various
attack densities.
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Figure 4.4: Model Recall

RF and GBT both produced very high F1-scores across all simulations. MLPC produced equivalent or lower metrics than RF and GBT. The MLPC had a lower score at a
40% attack density than the other models analyzed. Both the LR and SVM F1-scores were
greater than the proposed MLPC at 40% attack density, but otherwise had lower scores.
These results are shown in detail in Fig. 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Model F1-score

4.4.2

Training and Detection Time Using Multiple Clusters

Since PySpark is based off a distributed technology, it is important to see if any value is
gained from spreading the computation onto multiple vehicles. To simulate this process, the
50% attack percentage simulation was stored on in an Amazon S3 Bucket in Amazon Web
Services (AWS). Amazon Elastic MapReduce (EMR) is a tool used to set up servers with
multiple nodes that already contain all the schemes needed to run a PySpark cluster. AWS
also contains additional support for Jupyter Notebooks to run on an EMR spark cluster.
These clusters are designed to have a single master node and additional core nodes to
spread the computational overhead. Fig. 4.6 shows the software configuration on each
EMR instance. For this analysis, each EMR node (including the master node) was set up
using the m5.large type in AWS EMR. This server contained a 4vCore, 16 Gib memory,
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Figure 4.6: EMR Software Selection

and 64 Gib of storage. All logging was stored in an additional AWS S3 bucket.

To determine the performance difference of each instance configuration, both training
and prediction was timed running on 6 different AWS instances ranging from a single
master node to 6 nodes in total. The simulation including 35 cars was used for this analysis.
The Jupyter Notebook containing the algorithm was restarted and ran 10 different times for
each instance. Fig. 4.7 shows the time required to run training and utilize the algorithm
at each node count. Adding additional nodes did not prove to have a large impact on
the overall computation time. The median time did decrease marginally as nodes were
included. The code used for this analysis can be found in Appendix C.
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Figure 4.7: MPLC Computation Speed vs Node Amount

53

Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
Misbehavior detection systems is a paramount tool for the continued development of vehicular communication networks. Without the implementation of a MDS, all vehicles connected to the network would be vulnerable to attacks such as the distributed denial of service attack. Such attacks can block communication channels by flooding the network with
communication packets, causing confusion and potentially accidents. Machine learning
methods have proved to be effective in MDS, with recent efforts focused on methods such
as neural networks and distributed computing. In particular, publications such as [7], [1],
and [25] showed promising results for the use of neural networks in MDS. Both [6] and
[42] showed that distributed computing can greatly reduce the time required in a MDS. In
time critical systems such as a MDS, a tenth of a second in detection time could be all that
is needed to prevent an accident.
The logical next step was to investigate neural networks and distributed computing
methods in combination to see if they would continue to be performant on modern mobile
network simulators. This thesis focused on designing a multilayer perceptron classifier,
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also known as a feed forward neural network on vehicular communication simulations
built in OMNeT++, Veins, and SUMO. These simulations contained the distributed denial
of service (DDoS) attack conducted via the use of a few parked zombie vehicles. The
proposed MDS was built to utilize the Apache Spark distributed computing framework for
data processing and attack detection. By using this framework, we were able to analyze the
benefit of spreading the resource demand of model training and prediction against multiple
nodes. Amazon Web Services was used to run the Spark clusters, each Elastic MapReduce
(EMR) node was meant to simulate a nearby vehicle.
By only collecting x coordinate, y coordinate, speed, acceleration, and CO2 emissions
of each vehicle, RF was able to predict an DDoS attack with very high accuracy. If vehicles
are able to monitor and communicate this information in real time, it may not be necessary
to use big data tools. The exception to this may be large scale cities such as Seattle or
Denver that contain large amounts of vehicular traffic. It may be valuable to compare
the results on a large city wide simulation against a smaller simulation such as the one
presented in this research. Further investigation into the dataset such as DARPA and WITZ
a dataset with the part of the study of KAREN (Kiwi Advanced Research and Education
Network) should be considered before the widespread use of these methods.
Though a multilayer perceptron classifier (MLPC) is a powerful predictive algorithm,
it is evident that it may not be the most effective algorithm for application in misbehavior
detection in vehicular communication systems. The simulation generated from OMNeT++
only contained up to vehicles and ran for 380 seconds. From this small amount of data,
random forest (RF) and gradient boosted trees (GBT) were able to produce reasonable
accuracy, recall, precision, and F1-scores. In future studies, it may be worth investigating
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statistical learning methods that are less computationally expensive than RF and GBT.
This could help increase the speed of misbehavior detection and reduce the time delay on
distributed computing applications.
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Appendix A
OMNeT++ Simulation Code
The following sections show the modification to Veins used to generate all DDoS simulations used in this research. The following sections contain .ini, .ned, .h, and .cc files. Please
refer to the section title for the type of file being shown.

A.0.1

Simulation Set Up

Modified omnetpp.ini File
[General]
cmdenv-express-mode = true
cmdenv-autoflush = true
cmdenv-status-frequency = 1s
experiment-label = ${configname}
parallel-simulation = false
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parsim-synchronization-class = omnetpp::cNullMessageProtocol
simtime-resolution = ps
**.cmdenv-log-level = info

ned-path = .
image-path = ../../images

network = RSUExampleScenario

##########################################################
# Simulation parameters #
##########################################################
debug-on-errors = true
print-undisposed = true

sim-time-limit = 380s

**.scalar-recording = true
**.vector-recording = true

*.playgroundSizeX = 2500m
*.playgroundSizeY = 2500m
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*.playgroundSizeZ = 50m

##########################################################
# Annotation parameters #
##########################################################
*.annotations.draw = true

##########################################################
# Obstacle parameters #
##########################################################
*.obstacles.obstacles = xmldoc("config.xml", "//AnalogueModel[@type=’
,→ SimpleObstacleShadowing’]/obstacles")

##########################################################
# TraCIScenarioManager parameters #
##########################################################
*.manager.updateInterval = 1s
*.manager.host = "localhost"
*.manager.port = 9999
*.manager.autoShutdown = true
*.manager.launchConfig = xmldoc("erlangen.launchd.xml")
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##########################################################
# RSU SETTINGS #
# #
# #
##########################################################
*.hacker[0].mobility.y = 1500
*.hacker[1].mobility.y = 2150
*.hacker[1].mobility.x = 2150
*.hacker[0].mobility.x = 1500
*.rsu[0].mobility.x = 2000
*.rsu[0].mobility.y = 2000
*.rsu[0].mobility.z = 3

*.rsu[*].applType = "TraCIDemoRSU11p"
*.rsu[*].appl.headerLength = 80 bit
*.rsu[*].appl.sendBeacons = false
*.rsu[*].appl.dataOnSch = false
*.rsu[*].appl.beaconInterval = 1s
*.rsu[*].appl.beaconUserPriority = 7
*.rsu[*].appl.dataUserPriority = 5
*.rsu[*].nic.phy80211p.antennaOffsetZ = 0 m
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##########################################################
# 11p specific parameters #
# #
# NIC-Settings #
##########################################################
*.connectionManager.sendDirect = true
*.connectionManager.maxInterfDist = 2600m
*.connectionManager.drawMaxIntfDist = false

*.**.nic.mac1609_4.useServiceChannel = false

*.**.nic.mac1609_4.txPower = 20mW
*.**.nic.mac1609_4.bitrate = 6Mbps
*.**.nic.phy80211p.minPowerLevel = -89dBm # was -110

*.**.nic.phy80211p.useNoiseFloor = true
*.**.nic.phy80211p.noiseFloor = -98dBm

*.hacker[3].mobility.y = 1850
*.hacker[2].mobility.y = 2100
*.**.nic.phy80211p.decider = xmldoc("config.xml")
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*.**.nic.phy80211p.analogueModels = xmldoc("config.xml")
*.**.nic.phy80211p.usePropagationDelay = true

*.**.nic.phy80211p.antenna = xmldoc("antenna.xml", "/root/Antenna[@id
,→ =’monopole’]")
*.node[*].nic.phy80211p.antennaOffsetY = 0 m
*.node[*].nic.phy80211p.antennaOffsetZ = 1.895 m

##########################################################
# App Layer #
##########################################################
*.node[*].applType = "TraCIDemo11p"
*.node[*].appl.headerLength = 80 bit
*.node[*].appl.sendBeacons = false
*.node[*].appl.dataOnSch = false
*.node[*].appl.beaconInterval = 1s

##########################################################
# Mobility #
##########################################################
*.node[*].veinsmobility.x = 0
*.node[*].veinsmobility.y = 0
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*.node[*].veinsmobility.z = 0
*.node[*].veinsmobility.setHostSpeed = false
**.mobility.z = 3
*.node[*0].veinsmobility.accidentCount = 1
*.node[*0].veinsmobility.accidentStart = 73s
*.node[*0].veinsmobility.accidentDuration = 50s

**.hacker[*].applType = "AttackSim"
*.hacker[3].mobility.x = 2200
*.hacker[2].mobility.x = 1700

[Config WithBeaconing]
*.rsu[*].appl.sendBeacons = true
*.node[*].appl.sendBeacons = true

[Config WithChannelSwitching]
*.**.nic.mac1609_4.useServiceChannel = true
*.node[*].appl.dataOnSch = true
*.rsu[*].appl.dataOnSch = true

##########################################################
# DDoS #
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##########################################################
*.hacker[*].mobility.x = 2050
*.hacker[*].mobility.y = 2050
*.hacker[*].mobility.z = 3
*.hacker[*].applType ="AttackSim"
*.hacker[*].appl.headerLength = 80 bit
*.hacker[*].appl.sendBeacons = true
*.hacker[*].appl.dataOnSch = false
*.hacker[*].appl.beaconInterval = 1s
*.hacker[*].appl.beaconUserPriority = 7
*.hacker[*].appl.dataUserPriority = 5
*.hacker[*].nic.phy80211p.antennaOffsetZ = 0 m

Adding Attacking Vehicles to Communication System NED File
//
// Copyright (C) 2017 Christoph Sommer <sommer@ccs-labs.org>
//
// Documentation for these modules is at http://veins.car2x.org/
//
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
//
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// This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
,→ modify
// it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published
,→ by
// the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
// along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
// Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307
,→ USA
//

import org.car2x.veins.nodes.Car;
import org.car2x.veins.nodes.RSU;
import org.car2x.veins.nodes.Scenario;
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// the next line was added by Nick Jaton 2/16/2021
import org.car2x.veins.modules.application.DoS.HackerSim;

network RSUExampleScenario extends Scenario
{
submodules:
rsu[1]: RSU {
@display("p=150,140;i=veins/sign/yellowdiamond;is=vs");
}
// hacker was added by Nick Jaton 02/16/2021
hacker[4]: HackerSim {
@display("p=150,140;i=veins/node/car,#EF2929;is=
,→ vs");
}

}

Hacker NED File
package org.car2x.veins.modules.application.DoS;

import org.car2x.veins.base.modules.*;

73

import org.car2x.veins.modules.nic.Nic80211p;

module HackerSim
{
parameters:
string applType; //type of the application layer
string nicType = default("Nic80211p"); // type of network
,→ interface card

// Add mobility element 03-02-2021
string veinsmobilityType = default("org.car2x.veins.modules.
,→ mobility.traci.TraCIMobility"); //type of the mobility
,→ module
gates:
input veinsradioIn; // gate for sendDirect
submodules:
appl: <applType> like org.car2x.veins.base.modules.
,→ IBaseApplLayer {
parameters:
@display("p=60,50");
}
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nic: <nicType> like org.car2x.veins.modules.nic.INic80211p {
parameters:
@display("p=60,166");
}

mobility: BaseMobility {
parameters:
@display("p=130,172;i=block/cogwheel");
}

connections:
nic.upperLayerOut --> appl.lowerLayerIn;
nic.upperLayerIn <-- appl.lowerLayerOut;
nic.upperControlOut --> appl.lowerControlIn;
nic.upperControlIn <-- appl.lowerControlOut;

veinsradioIn --> nic.radioIn;
}

A.0.2

DDoS Implementation

Attacker NED File
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package org.car2x.veins.modules.application.DoS;

import org.car2x.veins.modules.application.ieee80211p.
,→ DemoBaseApplLayer;

simple AttackSim extends DemoBaseApplLayer
{
@class(veins::TraCIDemoRSU11p);
@display("i=block/app2");
}

Attacker Hex File

#pragma once

#include "veins/modules/application/ieee80211p/DemoBaseApplLayer.h"

namespace veins {
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/**********************************************************************/
,→
/**
* Small RSU 11p that is used for flooding
*/
/* This was the first attempt with stationary RSU based attacker
class VEINS_API AttackSim : public DemoBaseApplLayer {
protected:
void onWSM(BaseFrame1609_4* wsm) override;
void onWSA(DemoServiceAdvertisment* wsa) override;
};
*/

/**********************************************************************/
,→
/* this is a second attack based off of car communication (stationary)
,→ */
class VEINS_API AttackSim : public DemoBaseApplLayer {
public:
void initialize(int stage) override;

protected:
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simtime_t lastDroveAt;
bool sentMessage;
int currentSubscribedServiceId;

protected:
void onWSM(BaseFrame1609_4* wsm) override;
void onWSA(DemoServiceAdvertisment* wsa) override;

void handleSelfMsg(cMessage* msg) override;
void handlePositionUpdate(cObject* obj) override;
};

}

Attacker C++ File
#include "veins/modules/application/DoS/AttackSim.h"

#include "veins/modules/application/traci/TraCIDemo11pMessage_m.h"

#include <unordered_map>
using namespace veins;
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Define_Module(veins::AttackSim);

/* This attack is based off the idea of parked cars attacking
* Using the communication methods given.
*/

void AttackSim::initialize(int stage)
{
DemoBaseApplLayer::initialize(stage);
if (stage == 0) {
sentMessage = false;
lastDroveAt = simTime();
currentSubscribedServiceId = -1;
}
}

void AttackSim::onWSA(DemoServiceAdvertisment* wsa)
{
if (currentSubscribedServiceId == -1) {
mac->changeServiceChannel(static_cast<Channel>(wsa->
,→ getTargetChannel()));
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currentSubscribedServiceId = wsa->getPsid();
if (currentOfferedServiceId != wsa->getPsid()) {
stopService();
startService(static_cast<Channel>(wsa->getTargetChannel()),
,→ wsa->getPsid(), "Mirrored Traffic Service");
}
}
}

void AttackSim::onWSM(BaseFrame1609_4* frame)
{
TraCIDemo11pMessage* wsm = check_and_cast<TraCIDemo11pMessage*>(
,→ frame);

findHost()->getDisplayString().setTagArg("i", 1, "green");

if (mobility->getRoadId()[0] != ’:’) traciVehicle->changeRoute(wsm
,→ ->getDemoData(), 9999);

// End testing code
if (!sentMessage) {
sentMessage = true;
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// repeat the received traffic update once in 2 seconds plus
,→ some random delay
wsm->setSenderAddress(myId);
wsm->setSerial(3);
scheduleAt(simTime() + 2 + uniform(0.01, 0.2), wsm->dup());
}
}

void AttackSim::handleSelfMsg(cMessage* msg)
{
if (TraCIDemo11pMessage* wsm = dynamic_cast<TraCIDemo11pMessage*>(
,→ msg)) {
// send this message on the service channel until the counter
,→ is 3 or higher.
// this code only runs when channel switching is enabled
sendDown(wsm->dup());
wsm->setSerial(wsm->getSerial() + 1);
if (wsm->getSerial() >= 3) {
// stop service advertisements
stopService();
delete (wsm);
}
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else {
scheduleAt(simTime() + 1, wsm);
}
}
else {
DemoBaseApplLayer::handleSelfMsg(msg);
}
}

// Handle Position Update contains the attack.
void AttackSim::handlePositionUpdate(cObject* obj)
{
DemoBaseApplLayer::handlePositionUpdate(obj);

if((simTime() >= 50 && simTime() < 74) ||
(simTime() >= 210 && simTime() < 224)
) {

for (int i = 0; i < 25000; i++){

sentMessage = true;
TraCIDemo11pMessage* wsm = new TraCIDemo11pMessage();
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populateWSM(wsm);
wsm->setDemoData(mobility->getRoadId().c_str());

sendDown(wsm);
}
}
else {
lastDroveAt = simTime();
}
}
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Appendix B
Predictive Modeling Code
The following program was used on each simulation to determine the efficiency of each
predictive algorithm. This is written in Python, primary making use of PySpark.

# Load the data into Spark
from pyspark.sql import SparkSession

spark = SparkSession.builder.appName(’Test Vec Data’).getOrCreate()

vecData = (spark.read.format("csv" \
).option(’header’,’true’ \
).load("batch6/AttackSim.csv"))

# convert the data to floats
from pyspark.sql.functions import col
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from pyspark.sql.types import IntegerType

vecDataFloats = vecData.select(*(col(c).cast("float").alias(c) \
for c in vecData.columns))
vecDataFloats = vecDataFloats.withColumn("Attack Bool",
col("Attack Bool" \
).cast(IntegerType()))
vecDataFloats = vecDataFloats.withColumnRenamed("Attack Bool", "label
,→ ")

####################################################

# Set up model scoring methods
from pyspark.ml.evaluation import MulticlassClassificationEvaluator
eval_acc = MulticlassClassificationEvaluator(labelCol = ’label’,
metricName =’accuracy’)

eval_precision = MulticlassClassificationEvaluator(labelCol="label",
predictionCol="
,→ prediction",
metricName="
,→ precisionByLabel")
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eval_recall = MulticlassClassificationEvaluator(labelCol="label",
predictionCol="prediction",
metricName="recallByLabel")

eval_f1 = MulticlassClassificationEvaluator(labelCol="label",
predictionCol="prediction",
metricName="f1")

####################################################

from pyspark.ml.feature import VectorAssembler

ignore = [’Simulation’, ’label’]
assembler = VectorAssembler(
inputCols=[str(x) for x in vecDataFloats.columns if x not in
,→ ignore],
outputCol=’features’)

output = assembler.setHandleInvalid("skip").transform(vecDataFloats)
# output.printSchema()
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# Train test Split
train_data, test_data = output.randomSplit([.70,.30], seed=1)

####################################################

# Attempt to build regression model
from pyspark.ml.classification import LogisticRegression

lr = LogisticRegression(featuresCol = ’features’,
labelCol = ’label’,
maxIter=100)

lrModel = lr.fit(train_data)
lr_preds = lrModel.transform(test_data)

acc = eval_acc.evaluate(lr_preds)
precision = eval_precision.evaluate(lr_preds)
recall = eval_recall.evaluate(lr_preds)
f1score = eval_f1.evaluate(lr_preds)

print("LR Acc: "+ str(acc))
print("LR Prec: " + str(precision))
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print("LR Recall: " + str(recall))
print("LR F-score: " + str(f1score))

####################################################

# Build Random Forest Model
from pyspark.ml.classification import RandomForestClassifier
rf = RandomForestClassifier(featuresCol = ’features’,
labelCol = ’label’,
maxDepth=3)

rf_model = rf.fit(train_data)
rf_preds = rf_model.transform(test_data)

acc = eval_acc.evaluate(rf_preds)
precision = eval_precision.evaluate(rf_preds)
recall = eval_recall.evaluate(rf_preds)
f1score = eval_f1.evaluate(rf_preds)

print("RF Acc: "+ str(acc))
print("RF Prec: " + str(precision))
print("RF Recall: " + str(recall))
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print("RF F-score: " + str(f1score))

####################################################

# Build GBT
from pyspark.ml.classification import GBTClassifier
GBT = GBTClassifier(featuresCol = ’features’,
labelCol = ’label’,
maxIter=100)

GBT_model = GBT.fit(train_data)
GBT_preds = GBT_model.transform(test_data)

acc = eval_acc.evaluate(GBT_preds)
precision = eval_precision.evaluate(GBT_preds)
recall = eval_recall.evaluate(GBT_preds)
f1score = eval_f1.evaluate(GBT_preds)

print("GBT Acc: "+ str(acc))
print("GBT Prec: " + str(precision))
print("GBT Recall: " + str(recall))
print("GBT F-score: " + str(f1score))

89

####################################################

# Build Support Vector Machines
from pyspark.ml.classification import LinearSVC
SVC = LinearSVC(featuresCol = ’features’,
labelCol = ’label’,
maxIter=100)

SVC_model = SVC.fit(train_data)
SVC_preds = SVC_model.transform(test_data)

acc = eval_acc.evaluate(SVC_preds)
precision = eval_precision.evaluate(SVC_preds)
recall = eval_recall.evaluate(SVC_preds)
f1score = eval_f1.evaluate(SVC_preds)

print("SVC Acc: "+ str(acc))
print("SVC Prec: " + str(precision))
print("SVC Recall: " + str(recall))
print("SVC F-score: " + str(f1score))
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####################################################

# Build MLPC
from pyspark.ml.classification import MultilayerPerceptronClassifier
layers_1 = [76,81,5,5,2]

mpc = MultilayerPerceptronClassifier(featuresCol=’features’,
labelCol =’label’,
maxIter=100,
layers=layers_1,
blockSize=16,
solver = "l-bfgs",
seed=111)

mpc_model = mpc.fit(train_data)
mpc_preds = mpc_model.transform(test_data)

# MPC accuracy calcs
pred_and_label = mpc_preds.select("prediction", "label")

acc = eval_acc.evaluate(pred_and_label)
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precision = eval_precision.evaluate(pred_and_label)
recall = eval_recall.evaluate(pred_and_label)
f1score = eval_f1.evaluate(pred_and_label)

print("MPC Acc: "+ str(acc))
print("MPC Prec: " + str(precision))
print("MPC Recall: " + str(recall))
print("f1: " + str(f1score))
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Appendix C
AWS Node Testing Code
The following program contains the code used to test the computation time on the AWS
EMR cluster. This program is entirely written using PySpark. Please refer to section 4.4.2
for more information.

# AWS Pyspark code

# Load the data into Spark
from pyspark.sql import SparkSession

# Create spark session
spark = SparkSession.builder.appName(’AWS Cluster Testing’).
,→ getOrCreate()

input_bucket = ’s3://attack-sim/batch9_35Cars_50pct.csv’
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vecData = (spark.read.format("csv").option(’header’,
’true’ \
).load(input_bucket))

from pyspark.sql.functions import col
from pyspark.sql.types import IntegerType

vecDataFloats = vecData.select(* \
(col(c).cast("float").alias(c) \
for c in vecData.columns))

vecDataFloats = vecDataFloats.withColumn("Attack Bool",
col("Attack Bool" \
).cast(IntegerType()))

vecDataFloats = vecDataFloats.withColumnRenamed("Attack Bool",
"label")

# Set up metrics
from pyspark.ml.evaluation import MulticlassClassificationEvaluator
eval_acc = MulticlassClassificationEvaluator(labelCol = ’label’,
metricName =’accuracy’)
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eval_f1 = MulticlassClassificationEvaluator(labelCol="label",
predictionCol="prediction",
metricName="f1")

# Get data ready for MLPC
from pyspark.ml.feature import VectorAssembler

ignore = [’Simulation’, ’label’]
assembler = VectorAssembler(
inputCols=[str(x) for x in vecDataFloats.columns \
if x not in ignore],
outputCol=’features’)

output = assembler.setHandleInvalid("skip").transform(vecDataFloats)

# Split data into training and testing datasets
train_data, test_data = output.randomSplit([.70,.30], seed=1)

# Build a NN using pysparks built in library.
from pyspark.ml.classification import MultilayerPerceptronClassifier
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layers = [176,87,9,4,2]

import time
start_time = time.time()

# Build MLPC
mpc = MultilayerPerceptronClassifier(featuresCol=’features’,
labelCol =’label’,
maxIter=100,
layers=layers,
blockSize=16,
solver = "l-bfgs",
seed=111)

# Fit model and get results
mpc_model = mpc.fit(train_data)
mpc_preds = mpc_model.transform(test_data)

end_time = time.time()
print("Total execution time: {} seconds".format(end_time - start_time)
,→ )
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# MPC accuracy calcs
pred_and_label = mpc_preds.select("prediction", "label")

acc = eval_acc.evaluate(pred_and_label)
f1score = eval_f1.evaluate(pred_and_label)

print("MPC Acc: "+ str(acc))
print("MPC F-score: " + str(f1score))

